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Eurozone services price momentum is “unsticking” as expected, supporting the forecast of sub-2% 2025 inflation.

A post in September suggested that the ECB staff’s latest inflation forecast – like earlier projections – would be undershot.

With November’s favourable surprise, annual headline and core (i.e. ex. energy and food) consumer price inflation are on course to average 2.2% and 2.7% respectively in Q4, versus ECB September central projections of 2.6% and 2.9%.

Six-month headline / core momentum is still loosely tracking the profile of broad money growth two years earlier, a relationship suggesting a further decline and undershoot of the 2% target – see chart 1.

Chart 1

A fall in six-month core momentum to 2.1% annualised in November was driven by a sharp slowdown in services prices, which fell marginally on the month (ECB seasonally adjusted series).

Previous posts questioned central banks’ focus on “sticky” services inflation. Monetary conditions determine aggregate inflation, with the component breakdown partly shaped by “exogenous” factors. Earlier weakness in energy / food and core goods prices suppressed headline inflation while allowing consumers to spend more on services, delaying price deceleration in that sector. The suggestion was that services disinflation would speed up as downward pressure on goods prices eased.

This appears to be playing out: six-month goods momentum has recovered, mainly reflecting food price reacceleration and a slower fall in energy costs, with the headline impact neutralised by a “surprise” services slowdown – chart 2.

Chart 2

The “monetarist” relationship, taken at face value, implies a period of falling prices in 2025. The judgement here is to downplay this possibility and regard the monetary signal as directional rather than giving strong guidance about the level of price momentum.

The stock of money could still be above “equilibrium”, implying a cushion against deflation. This question can be addressed using the “quantity theory of wealth” – the idea that asset prices and incomes adjust such that a geometric average of wealth and nominal GDP rises in line with broad money over the medium term.

Chart 3 shows that, using Q4 2018 as a base, nominal GDP has lagged broad money significantly while wealth has slightly outpaced it. The nominal GDP / wealth average was still 2% short of the level implied by the money stock as of Q2 2024.

Chart 3

A small “excess” money cushion, along with recent currency weakness, may head off an extreme scenario but money trends still suggest a sustained inflation undershoot and a need for further policy easing to achieve medium-term realignment.

November results confirm a September low in global manufacturing PMI new orders, with money trends suggesting a further rise through spring 2025, subject to tariff distortions.

The baseline scenario here has been that global industrial momentum – proxied by the manufacturing PMI new orders index – would bottom out in late 2024 and recover weakly into H1 2025. A manufacturing upturn was expected to be offset by loss of services momentum, with associated labour market weakness combining with favourable inflation news to support faster monetary policy easing.

The manufacturing part of the story is on track. The forecast of a late 2024 PMI new orders low was based on a recovery in global six-month real narrow money momentum from a trough in September 2023, taking into account a recent average interval of about a year between turning points in the two series. The new orders index reached a 22-month low on schedule in September, recovering solidly in October / November – see chart 1.

Chart 1

The turnaround has been mirrored by an alternative indicator based on national business surveys, although this bottomed one month earlier in August and has recovered by slightly less – chart 2.

Chart 2

Chart 3 highlights the recent relationship between swings in six-month real narrow money momentum and directional changes in the alternative indicator. Real money momentum recovered between September 2023 and April 2024 but has since stalled at a weak level by historical standards, falling back in September / October.

Chart 3

Assuming that the lead time remains at about a year, the suggestion is that a rise in the survey indicator / PMI new orders will level off in spring 2025, falling short of prior historical peaks.

Forecast uncertainty is higher than normal because tariff threats are distorting behaviour. Accelerated stockbuilding could result in a stronger near-term pick-up and earlier peak with a subsequent normalisation – or worse if threats crystallise.

Eurozone money trends are improving but remain too weak to support economic optimism, while country details highlight French stress.

A post in June noted that six-month real narrow money momentum was still significantly negative, suggesting that a minor economic recovery in H1 2024 would give way to a H2 “double dip”. The PMI composite output index fell from 50.9 in June to a flash reading of 48.1 in November.

Six-month real money momentum has risen further since June but was still barely positive in October. It has, however, crossed above Japan and narrowed a shortfall with the US, implying improving relative prospects – chart 1.

Chart 1

Consensus gloom about Germany may be overdone. Six-month nominal narrow money momentum has swung into positive territory since mid-year, catching up with Spain / Italy – chart 2.

Chart 2

French momentum, by contrast, remains negative, with a recovery stalling in September / October.

French narrow money weakness appears to reflect low confidence and spending intentions rather than deposit flight (so far). Annual growth of all bank deposits slowed sharply in September / October but is still on a par with in Germany – chart 3.

Chart 3

France’s deficit in the TARGET system rose by €34 billion in September to a record €175 billion, which could signal a capital outflow related to the political / fiscal crisis. There has, however, been no corresponding increase in Germany’s surplus, for which an October number is available – chart 4.

Chart 4

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COMMENT:
AUTHOR: David Cotton
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IP: 81.133.120.59
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DATE: 11/28/2024 03:56:56 PM

Real money growth at such low levels will inevitably lead to rising unemployment. That should be the focus for policy makers.

A lot of them are seemingly still obsessed by lagging inflation data.

A pull-back in US narrow money momentum casts doubt on post-election economic optimism.

Six-month growth of M1A (comprising currency in circulation and demand deposits) eased to 5.7% annualised in October, down from an August peak of 10.0% – see chart 1.

Chart 1

Growth of the broad M2+ measure, by contrast, rose to 5.1% annualised, the fastest since March 2022. (M2+ adds large time deposits at commercial banks and institutional money funds to the official M2 measure.) Narrow money, however, has a better record of signalling turning points in economic momentum.

Six-month expansion of official M1 is weaker, at 2.9%. M1 is no longer a narrow money measure, following its redefinition in 2020 to include savings accounts.

A post in September expressed doubt that a pick-up in M1A growth would be sustained, partly because it had occurred before any rate cuts. In addition, the rise had been driven solely by the demand deposit component, with currency momentum unusually weak.

Six-month growth of currency has recovered but was still only 1.7% annualised in October – chart 1.

A further consideration, noted in a post last month, is that narrow money growth has tended to rise ahead of presidential elections but reverse shortly before or after the poll date – chart 2. (1984 and 2000 were notable exceptions.)

Chart 2

The pull-back to date has been modest but could become more serious, especially if the Fed delays further rate cuts.

Broad money growth, however, could be supported by increased monetary financing of the fiscal deficit, based on Treasury plans for higher bill issuance in Q4 and Q1 (given that these are mostly purchased by money funds and banks).

Narrow / broad money divergences can reflect shifts in confidence and spending intentions affecting broad money velocity. (Such shifts are associated with movements between low-velocity broad money components and high-velocity narrow money.) Relative narrow money strength into the summer was a positive signal for the economy; the reversal suggests fading prospects.

The Bank of England’s favoured broad money measure – M4 excluding money holdings of non-bank financial intermediaries – rose by 0.3% in February, defying expectations of weakness following the cessation of the Bank’s gilt-buying in January.

Within overall broad money, M4 holdings of private non-financial corporations rose by 0.5%, pushing three-month growth up to an annualised 4.6%. Companies also increased their foreign currency deposits while continuing to repay bank borrowing, resulting in a further rise in the liquidity ratio to its highest level since June 2007 – see chart. Corporate M4 and the liquidity ratio are better leading indicators of the economy than aggregate broad money.

Corporate credit contraction reflects demand weakness much more than inadequate supply – retained earnings are running well ahead of capital spending so firms must either increase their holdings of financial assets or repay debt. Credit demand should revive as investment and hiring recover. The decline in “sterling unused credit facilities” slowed to an annual 8.7% in February versus a peak of 19.5% last April.

While corporate money is picking up, financial institutions’ M4 holdings – excluding intermediaries – fell again in February and have declined by 20% annualised over the last three months. Lower cash levels imply less “fuel” to propel asset prices higher, consistent with other evidence of a deteriorating liquidity backdrop for markets.

The rise in aggregate broad money in February reflected a strong positive influence from external and foreign currency flows, according to the Bank’s “credit counterparts” analysis. The “externals” were heavily negative during 2009 as a portion of the liquidity created by the Bank’s gilt purchases flowed overseas. This effect may now be reversing.

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COMMENT:
AUTHOR: sofyanto
EMAIL:
IP: 36.85.223.183
URL: https://kabela-kabela.blogspot.com
DATE: 11/26/2024 10:18:24 PM

great article, i usually rarely read entire an article but this time i was force to read entire your article because very interesting financial management

The current stockbuilding cycle may be approaching its mid-point, which typically marks a shift from “risk-on” to a neutral or negative market environment

The stockbuilding (or inventory or Kitchin) cycle is usually described as ranging between 3 and 5 years. The dating here suggests a normal band of 2.5 to 4.5 years, with an average of about 3.5.

A key indicator used to inform judgements about cycle dates is the annual change in G7 stockbuilding, expressed as a percentage of GDP. Chart 1 shows a long history of this indicator, along with suggested cycle low dates.

Chart 1

There were 16 complete cycles, measured from low to low, between Q2 1967 and Q1 2023, a period of 55.75 years. This implies an average cycle length of 3.5 years or 42 months.

The cycle described in a 1923 article by Joseph Kitchin averaged 40 months. Kitchin analysed data on bank clearings, commodity prices and interest rates and did not explicitly link his cycle with inventory fluctuations. His average was based on 9 cycles spanning 30 years, i.e. a smaller data set than shown in chart 1.

An average of about 3.5 years harmonises with the longer-term housing cycle, with an accepted average length of 18 years. Five stockbuilding cycles “nest” within each complete housing cycle, implying an average length of 3.6 years (43 months).

The most recent stockbuilding cycle trough is judged to have been reached in Q1 2023. Assuming a starting point in the middle of the quarter, November 2024 is month 21 of the current cycle.

The annual change in G7 stockbuilding was still negative in Q3 and usually becomes significantly positive at peaks, suggesting that the cycle remains an expansionary influence on economic momentum currently.

The cycle is as important for markets as the economy (as shown by Kitchin’s reliance on commodity price and interest rate data). The first half of the cycle (starting from a trough) is typically favourable for risk assets and cyclical exposure. Bear markets and crises have historically been concentrated in cycle downswings.

Table 1 compares movements in various assets since the Q1 2023 trough – third column – with average performance in the first 21 months of the prior 8 cycles (stretching back to the mid 1990s) – first column. The second column shows average performance over the remainder of those 8 cycles.

Table 1

The current cycle has so far largely conformed to the historical pattern, with strong performance of equities, cyclical sectors, precious metals and credit. The suggestion is that remaining upside potential is limited in these areas, with weakness likely over the next 1-2 years as a cycle downswing unfolds.

Could the current cycle prove to be longer than average, extending the risk-on phase? A longer cycle is plausible both because the previous one was short (2.75 years) and to align with the business investment cycle, for which the dating here implies a low in 2027 or later.

A delayed entry to the downswing phase could imply catch-up potential for areas that have lagged relative to history, including non-US / EM equities and commodities.

Cycle timings, however, could be affected by accelerated stockbuilding in anticipation of tariff wars, which could bring forward the cycle peak, although this would not necessarily imply an earlier trough.

The overall message is cautionary. A previous post argued that the “excess” money backdrop for markets is now neutral / negative in stock as well as flow terms. Cyclical considerations reinforce the monetary message.

Japanese money trends remain ominously weak, suggesting poor economic / market prospects and a return of inflation to unacceptably low levels.

Annual growth rates of broad money M3 and narrow money M1 fell to 0.7% and 1.5% respectively in October, well below 2010-19 averages of 2.6% / 5.1% and the lowest since the GFC – see chart 1.

Chart 1

Record f/x intervention resulted in monetary contraction in Q2 but a subsequent recovery has been minor, partly reflecting BoJ policy tightening. M3 and M1 grew at annualised rates of 0.5% and 0.1% in the three months to October – chart 2.

Chart 2

Japanese economic prospects represent another test of “monetarist” vs. consensus forecasting approaches. The BoJ / consensus view is that above-potential economic growth, a tight labour market and a gradual rise in adaptive inflationary expectations will result in annual CPI inflation – on both the targeted ex. fresh food measure and the BoJ’s core index also excluding energy – remaining close to the 2% target in FY 2025 and FY 2026. The BoJ views risks as skewed to the upside, warranting a tightening bias.

The “monetarist” view, by contrast, is that 2022-23 inflation resulted from a temporary spike in money growth in 2020, with the effects extended by a big fall in the yen. With money growth well below the 2010-19 average, CPI inflation is heading back to, or beneath, its corresponding average of 0.5%, unless the exchange rate suffers a further collapse.

Headline CPI numbers have been affected by changes in energy and travel subsidies but six-month core momentum (on the standard international definition excluding all food as well as energy) has fallen back below 2% annualised, consistent directionally with the earlier slowdown in money growth – chart 3. The level of core momentum still incorporates the effects of yen weakness.

Chart 3

Chart 4 shows the contributions of the “credit counterparts” to annual M3 growth, with data available through September. Comparing with growth a year earlier, the largest drag has been a shift in domestic credit to government from expansion to slight contraction, reflecting the impact of f/x sales (which reduce government borrowing needs) and the BoJ moving from QE to QT.

Chart 4

A slowdown in domestic credit to other sectors has also exerted a negative influence. The measure shown is significantly broader than the BoJ’s series for loans and discounts by commercial banks but growth in the latter has also moderated recently, while the latest senior loan officer survey reported weaker expectations for credit demand – chart 5.

Chart 5

Is there still an overhang of money from the 2020 surge sufficient to sustain nominal economic expansion despite current low M3 growth? This can be answered using the “quantity theory of wealth” – the idea that asset prices and incomes adjust such that a geometric average of wealth and nominal GDP rises in line with broad money over the medium term.

Chart 6 shows that, using Q4 2018 as a base, a nominal GDP undershoot relative to broad money (i.e. a fall in conventionally defined velocity) has been offset by a wealth overshoot, resulting in the average moving slightly ahead of the level implied by the money stock in Q2 2024.

Chart 6

The suggestion is that an “excess” money reserve has been exhausted and, unless asset prices fall, current low money growth will be reflected in nominal economic weakness.

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COMMENT:
AUTHOR: David Cotton
EMAIL:
IP: 82.132.212.144
URL:
DATE: 11/15/2024 08:49:15 AM

The BOJ should act, but like other central banks they can't see through the fog of fiscal policy and the fear of a 70s style inflation resurgence.

Global “excess” liquidity has surged to a level breached only twice over the last half-century, implying a favourable backdrop for risk assets, according to a Bloomberg article. The assessment here, by contrast, is that excess money conditions are neutral / negative.

Actual growth of the money stock can exceed or fall short of the rate of increase of money demand for economic and portfolio purposes. Deviations are reflected partly in changes in demand for financial / real assets and associated price movements.

The rate of increase of (real) money demand is unobservable. Two proxies are 1) the current rate of (real) economic expansion and 2) a long-term average of real money growth, this being assumed to capture the trend rise in money demand.

Accordingly, the approach followed here historically has relied on two flow indicators of excess or deficient money:

• The gap between real narrow money and industrial output momentum (six-month rates of change preferred).

• The deviation of real narrow money momentum from a long-term average (12-month rate of change preferred).

Chart 1 shows a cumulative return index of global equities relative to US dollar cash together with the two indicators. The indicators have been lagged to allow for reporting delays, i.e. the readings for a particular month would have been known at the time (ignoring revisions). Shaded areas denote double-positive readings. Equities outperformed cash significantly on average during these periods (i.e. averaging performance in the month following each monthly signal). They underperformed on average under mixed or double-negative readings.

Chart 1

The first indicator is hovering around zero while the second remains negative.

The excess liquidity indicator referred to in the Bloomberg article is described as measuring how much real money growth outperforms economic growth, suggesting that it should resemble the first indicator above. Like here, narrow (M1) money is used in the calculation. Coverage, however, is restricted to the G10 developed markets and growth rates may be measured over 12 rather than six months.

Chart 2 shows a G7 version of the real narrow money / industrial output momentum gap calculated on a 12-month basis, which should be a close substitute for a G10 measure. This indicator turned positive in July but is far from historical highs.

Chart 2

What explains the much more bullish Bloomberg reading? The guess here is that the Bloomberg indicator is a deviation of the real money / economic growth gap from some measure of trend, rather than its absolute level. The current gap, for example, is significantly higher than a 24-month moving average, also shown in chart 2.

In this case, the Bloomberg indicator would be better described as a measure of excess money acceleration rather than growth. The current high reading would reflect a recovery in excess money momentum from deep negative to slightly positive.

Conceptually, it is unclear why the demand for assets should be related to the second derivative of excess money rather than its growth or level. The Bloomberg indicator correctly signalled the strength of equity markets this year, though not in 2023. Backtesting indicates that the sign of an acceleration measure would have underperformed that of the level of excess money growth in signalling whether equity markets returns were above or below cash rates historically.

Why did the measures shown in chart 1 “miss” the strength of equity markets in 2023-24?

Excess or deficient money need not affect all markets similarly. Treasuries, commercial property and commodities may have borne the brunt of a money flow shortfall.

Preference for equities has been boosted by the AI boom and associated strength in a small number of large cap stocks. The MSCI World equal-weighted index has underperformed US dollar cash since the excess money indicators in chart 1 turned negative around end-2021.

The key reason for the disconnect with market performance, however, is that the flow measures were, on this occasion, an insufficient guide to the excess money backdrop, failing to take account of a still-large stock overhang left over from the 2020-21 money growth surge.

The “quantity theory of wealth”, explained in posts in 2020, is a suggested modification of the traditional quantity theory recognising that (broad) money demand depends on wealth as well as income and proposing equal elasticities. Nominal income is replaced on the right-hand side of the equation of exchange MV = PY by a geometric mean of income and wealth.

Chart 3 applies the “theory” to US data since end-2014.

Chart 3

The combined income / wealth variable closely tracked moderate growth of broad money over 2015-19. Wealth rose faster than income, so traditionally-defined velocity fell. The velocity of the combined income / wealth measure was stable.

The policy response to the covid shock resulted in possibly unprecedented monetary disequilibrium. Asset prices responded swiftly to the excess, causing wealth to overshoot broad money in 2021. Excess money flow indicators turned negative around end-2021 and wealth corrected sharply in 2022.

The combined income / wealth measure was still well below the level implied by broad money even before this correction. Deployment of the excess stock fuelled a second surge in wealth from late 2022 while sustaining economic growth despite monetary policy tightening.

Asset price gains, goods / services inflation and real economic expansion resulted in the income / wealth measure finally converging with broad money at end-Q2, with an estimated small overshoot at end-Q3. So the velocity of the combined measure has returned to its end-2019 level.

Stock as well as flow considerations, therefore, suggest that the excess money backdrop is now neutral at best.

Global (i.e. G7 plus E7) six-month real narrow money momentum is estimated to have edged lower in September, based on monetary data covering 88% of the aggregate. Momentum has been moving sideways since the spring at a weak level by historical standards, suggesting that the global economy will expand at a below-trend pace through mid-2025 – see chart 1. 

Chart 1

Note that the global narrow money measure incorporates an adjustment for a recent negative distortion to Chinese data from regulatory changes, i.e. momentum would be weaker than shown without this correction. 

A low in real money momentum in September 2023 was expected here to be reflected in a decline in global industrial momentum – as proxied by the manufacturing PMI new orders index – into a low in late 2024. October flash results could be consistent with a bottoming out: PMIs fell in Japan and the UK but recovered slightly in the US and Eurozone – chart 2. 

Chart 2

With money trends remaining weak, a manufacturing recovery into H1 2025 was expected to be limited and offset by a loss of momentum in services. Services business activity indices in the Eurozone and UK fell to 20- and 23-month lows respectively in October, according to flash results, with a sharper decline in Japan. US activity and new business indices, however, were strong, although the employment component remained sub-50. 

Chart 3

US relative strength is also evidenced by October earnings revisions ratios, with US net upgrades contrasting with weakness in Japan and Europe, particularly the UK – chart 4. 

Chart 4

US economic outperformance is consistent with a recent wide gap between US and European / Japanese six-month real narrow money momentum. The expectation here was for a US pull-back in September due to an unfavourable base effect but this proved minor, with narrow money rising solidly again on the month – chart 5. 

Chart 5

Eurozone / UK real narrow money momentum continues to recover but disappointingly slowly, suggesting a more urgent need for policy easing. A slump in Japan, initially due to f/x intervention but sustained by BoJ policy tightening, signals likely further negative economic news. 

US narrow money acceleration started long before the September rate cut and hasn’t been mirrored by broader aggregates. One interpretation is that households / firms are accumulating “transactions” money in anticipation of increasing spending after the elections. Chart 6 suggests a tendency for narrow money momentum to pick up into presidential elections and reverse thereafter, with occasional notable exceptions (1984, 2000). 

Chart 6

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COMMENT:
AUTHOR: David Cotton
EMAIL:
IP: 81.133.120.59
URL:
DATE: 10/30/2024 06:57:19 PM

Caution probably warranted over the US data given the unusual divergence between currency in circulation and demand deposit growth. Crucially no sign of a turnaround in vacancies or the quits rate.

The MPC’s slowness to cut rates risks aggravating a recent loss of economic momentum and prolonging an inflation undershoot.

The expected 25 bp cut in November would be insufficient to catch up with reductions to date in the Eurozone, Sweden, Switzerland and Canada – see chart 1.

Chart 1

UK annual headline consumer price inflation is as low or lower than in all these jurisdictions except Switzerland – chart 2.

Chart 2

The MPC’s focus on the “core services” third of the inflation basket is misplaced. Monetary conditions determine aggregate inflation, with the component breakdown partly shaped by “exogenous” factors. A fall in energy prices and slowdown in food costs have suppressed headline inflation while allowing consumers to spend more on other items, delaying price deceleration in these areas.

This suggested that services disinflation would speed up as commodity prices stabilised or recovered, a development that appears to be playing out – chart 3.

Chart 3

Six-month consumer price momentum continues to mirror the profile of broad money growth two years earlier, a relationship suggesting a further decline and extended undershoot of the 2% target. A recovery in six-month broad money momentum has stalled below the 4.5% pa level historically consistent with 2% inflation – chart 4.

Chart 4

UK six-month real narrow money momentum is negative and similar to levels in the Eurozone, Sweden and Switzerland, suggesting equally poor economic prospects – chart 5.

Chart 5

The double dip mooted in an earlier post could be under way. Recent signs of a loss of momentum include a faster rate of decline of job vacancies and an increase in small firm earnings downgrades – chart 6.

Chart 6

The previous government’s fiscal plans implied significant tightening in 2024 and 2025, according to the OBR – chart 7. Changes to the fiscal rules to be announced by Chancellor Reeves will allow for additional medium-term borrowing but are unlikely to alleviate near-term restriction.

Chart 7

It might be expected that the MPC would be especially sensitive to downside risks, following its mistake of responding too late in the opposite scenario in 2021-22 when inflation was starting to rip. Could confirmation of economic weakness and a restrictive Budget yet put a warranted 50 bp on the table for November?

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COMMENT:
AUTHOR: David Cotton
EMAIL:
IP: 87.224.97.121
URL:
DATE: 10/23/2024 02:16:40 PM

The Labour market is much weaker than the headline unemployment number suggests and the ONS advise caution with the data. The claimant count and HMRC payroll numbers are giving a much better idea of the real situation.

Tightening fiscal policy now is a big policy mistake. My expectation is much more rapid rate cuts in the next 12 months which will finally un-invert yield curve(s)…