Category: Money Moves Markets

The 138,000 jump in claimant-count unemployment in February appears to represent pay-back for surprisingly modest increases in earlier months.

The rise brings the cumulative increase since the low in January 2008 to 596,000. This is larger than at the equivalent stage of the 1970s labour market recession but below the rises in the early 1980s and early 1990s – see first chart.

A similar analysis for job vacancies gives a slightly different message: the decline from the peak in March 2008 is greater than in the early 1990s recession but is trailing the falls in the 1970s and 1980s – second chart.

These earlier episodes indicate that vacancies are unlikely to bottom before October 2009 at the earliest, while unemployment may continue to rise well into 2010.

Fourth-quarter US flow of funds accounts, released last week, confirm that broad money is growing at a respectable pace and has picked up in inflation-adjusted terms. Corporate monetary trends are healthier than in the UK and Eurozone, suggesting less pressure for business retrenchment.

The flow of funds accounts permit a more thorough analysis of broad money trends than is possible from weekly and monthly money supply releases. First, the accounts provide information on all the components of the old M3 – discontinued in 2006. Secondly, an adjusted M3-type measure can be calculated excluding money holdings of quasi-banks, which have been boosted by the financial crisis. Thirdly, this adjusted broad money measure can be broken down between households, non-financial business and financial institutions such as insurance companies and pension funds.*

Annual growth in adjusted broad money stood at 6.5% at the end of 2008, below a 9.9% December rise in the narrower M2 aggregate but above a 3.8% rate of increase of the equivalent UK measure (adjusted M4) – first chart. The 6.5% expansion was down from 7.6% at the end of the third quarter but a sharp fall in consumer price inflation resulted in real growth accelerating from 2.5% to 6.4%, implying greater monetary support for the economy in 2009 – second chart.

The 6.5% aggregate increase breaks down into growth of 5.3% for households, 6.2% for non-financial business and 13.9% for financial institutions – third chart. This suggests less pressure on non-financial business liquidity than in the UK and Eurozone: UK M4 holdings of private non-financial corporations fell by 4.7% in the year to January, while Eurozone non-financial corporate M3 rose by just 1.8% – fourth chart.

* Definitions:
M2 = currency, checkable deposits, savings deposits, small time deposits and retail money funds, other than held by government, monetary authority, depository institutions and foreign banks / official institutions
M3 = M2 plus large time deposits, institutional money funds, repurchase agreements and Eurodollar deposits, other than held by government, monetary authority, depository institutions, money funds and foreign banks / official institutions (discontinued)
Flow of funds adjusted broad money = checkable deposits and currency, time and savings deposits, money funds, repurchase agreements and foreign deposits, other than held by government, monetary authority, commercial banks, savings institutions, credit unions, money funds, “funding corporations” (= quasi-banks) and rest of world

The reclassification by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) of the Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds Banking Group as public corporations will be a big help to the efforts of the chancellor, Alistair Darling, to limit fiscal red ink. The banks’ underlying profits will be booked as public sector income, significantly reducing net borrowing.

At first sight this looks odd since the banks suffered a combined operating loss before tax of £49.0 billion in 2008 and may remain in the red in 2009. ONS guidance, however, indicates that the profits definition to be used will exclude dealing/investment losses, credit impairments and goodwill write-downs. Profits before these deductions were a combined £27.7 billion in 2008. (The ONS figure could be lower because of other adjustments, e.g. excluding undistributed income of foreign subsidiaries.) RBS and Lloyds are to be included in the public sector from 13 October 2008.

The chancellor is widely expected to announce a large upward revision to his public sector net borrowing forecast of £118 billion in 2009-10 in next month’s Budget, reflecting a much deeper recession than projected by the Treasury last November. The average independent projection is £128 billion, according to the Treasury’s monthly survey of forecasters. The inclusion of the banks’ profits, however, implies that Darling could announce little or no increase.

The effect, of course, is entirely artificial: although not included in public borrowing, the losses suffered by the banks are real and have been reflected in the value of the government’s shareholdings. With no improvement in the public sector’s true financial position, the classification change does not create additional fiscal “room for manoeuvre”.

The ONS previously announced that the reclassification of the banks would boost public net debt by between 70 and 100 percentage points of gross domestic product from 47.8% currently.

The sharp falls in many financial markets in late 2008 partly reflected forced position-closing by leveraged investors. Leverage levels now appear to be low by the standards of recent years, suggesting that future market moves will be driven more by “fundamentals”.

A measure of equity market leverage is margin debt outstanding on the New York Stock Exchange. This has fallen by 54% from a peak in July 2007, reaching its lowest level since August 2004 – see first chart below.

In the corporate bond market, deleveraging by market-makers with excessive inventory contributed to rapid price declines in late 2008. US primary dealers’ net long position in corporate securities is now the lowest since August 2003 – second chart.

Hedge fund leverage is difficult to measure directly but can be proxied by the sensitivity of their returns to market movements. The 30-day trailing betas of the FTSE “all strategies” and “directional equity” hedge fund indices to the FTSE World equity index are close to zero, suggesting little net market exposure – third chart.

As investors scrambled to close positions in late 2008, the Chicago Board Options Exchange implied volatility (VIX) index spiked to its highest level since the October 1987 stock market crash. Recent further equity declines were associated with a lower peak in volatility – fourth chart. A similar “non-confirmation” occurred at the October 2002 US stock market low, retested in March 2003.

In January, the IMF predicted that the UK would suffer the largest GDP decline of the Group of Seven (G7) economies in 2009. This forecast looked suspect at the time – see here – and is not supported by recent data.

UK GDP peaked in the first quarter of last year and had fallen by 2.2% by the fourth quarter. Over the same period, however, GDP dropped by 3.0% in Italy, 3.1% in Germany and a whopping 4.8% in Japan. Canada was the best performer among the G7, with a decline of just 0.5%.

According to figures released today, UK industrial output fell by a further 2.6% in January to stand 11.4% below its level last February, when G7 industrial activity began to contract. Germany, France, Italy and Japan have all registered larger declines, however, while UK performance is only slightly worse than the US – see first chart.

Forward-looking indicators are also no weaker than the average. The second chart shows a measure of new orders derived from purchasing managers’ surveys of manufacturing and services. The UK indicator has risen for three consecutive months and is slightly above its US counterpart and significantly higher than the Eurozone measure, which is still falling. Meanwhile, stock market earnings revisions have been less negative than elsewhere recently – third chart.

Countries that tackle the shortage of money and credit will be the first to emerge from recession. The MPC should have embarked on “quantitative easing” last autumn, at the same time as the US Federal Reserve. It has at least acted before the European Central Bank and Bank of Japan, suggesting the UK is well-placed to recover earlier than the Eurozone and Japan.

The terms agreed by Lloyds / HBOS for its participation in the asset protection scheme appear to represent a good deal for the bank but the attraction for private shareholders is significantly reduced by their enforced dilution due to upfront payment to the Treasury in new B shares.

Combined lending of Lloyds and HBOS in the form of loans and advances to customers and holdings of trading and investment securities amounted to £935 billion at the end of 2008. The £250 billion of assets to be covered by the insurance scheme represents 27% of this sum.

Lloyds will suffer a first loss of 10% on the covered assets and a 10% share of additional losses, for which it will pay a fee equivalent to 6.25%. So the total cost of participation will be:

10 + 6.25 + 0.1 * (L – 10) %

where L = the ultimate percentage loss on the covered assets.

To justify participation, Lloyds must believe that this cost is less than L itself, i.e.:

L > 10 + 6.25 + 0.1 * (L – 10)

Rearranging terms and simplifying, participation is worthwhile if the ultimate loss L is greater than 16.9%.

Now assume that Lloyds has dumped all of its suspect assets into the scheme and that losses will be negligible on the remaining 73% of its lending. The 16.9% breakeven loss on the covered assets then translates into a 4.5% loss on its total lending.

As explained in a previous post, British banks in aggregate suffered five-year credit losses of 8.9% and 7.1% of assets at risk following the recessions of the early 1980s and early 1990s respectively. Assuming that 1) current losses are on the same scale or larger, 2) the combined loan book of Lloyds and HBOS is of no better than average quality and 3) Lloyds has succeeded in placing its lowest-quality assets in the scheme, the fee charged looks inexpensive.

Yesterday’s Bank of England news release states that “the Committee will monitor the effectiveness of this purchase programme in boosting the supply of money and credit”. However, the MPC needs to clarify which monetary measures it is monitoring and how big a boost it is aiming to achieve.

Headline M4 and M4 lending numbers are unusable at present, having been inflated by an explosion in money holdings and bank borrowing of “intermediate other financial corporations”. This reflects the replacement of traditional unsecured interbank borrowing and lending by secured forms of lending channelled through off-balance-sheet entities and third parties such as the London Clearing House.

The MPC will probably focus on the Bank of England’s adjusted M4 and lending measures, which exclude these financial intermediaries. Annual growth rates are published quarterly in a chart in the Inflation Report, with underlying data provided in a spreadsheet. Adjusted M4 rose by an annual 3.8% in December versus 16.1% for headline M4; the corresponding numbers for adjusted and headline M4 lending were 3.8% and 15.9%. Bank statisticians also calculate monthly estimates for the MPC meetings but these are not currently published (I have submitted a request for access under freedom of information provisions).

While it is not possible to derive the Bank of England’s adjusted measures from published data, monthly figures can be calculated for M4 and lending excluding all financial corporations, i.e. covering only households and non-financial companies. The latest annual growth rates, for January, were 2.8% and 4.9% respectively. Asset purchases, however, will boost the money holdings of traditional financial institutions – insurance companies, pension funds, unit and investment trusts etc. – in the first instance so the omission of the financial sector is a major disadvantage for monitoring the progress of the scheme.

A previous post argued that the MPC should aim to deliver a five percentage point boost to the annual growth rate of adjusted M4, i.e. from 3.8% to about 9%. The announced programme looks consistent with this target but the MPC should be prepared to adjust operations – in either direction – in light of incoming monetary data.

In the same way that individuals and companies settle transactions using accounts at commercial banks, banks themselves have accounts at the central bank that they use for clearing purposes. Quantitative easing – or tightening – refers to central bank actions that expand or contract the supply of funds held in these reserve accounts.

In operating monetary policy, central banks can alter either the price of money – interest rates – or the quantity of reserves. In recent years interest rate changes have been the dominant tool but historically policy-makers also used quantitative actions to achieve their goals.

A cut in interest rates boosts the economy by stimulating spending and borrowing. Higher bank borrowing results in an expansion in the amount of money in individuals’ and firms’ bank accounts – the broad money supply. This monetary expansion leads to further increases in spending and economic activity.

With quantitative easing, the central bank buys securities from the private sector and pays for them by crediting banks’ reserve accounts – effectively creating new reserves by the click of a mouse. This can boost the economy in two ways. First, if the central bank buys from individuals or firms, the money in their accounts with commercial banks increases, matching the rise in the banks’ reserves with the central bank. This increase in the broad money supply then encourages higher spending.

Secondly, the higher level of reserves may encourage commercial banks to lend more. The higher lending may be associated with a rise in spending and results in a further expansion of the broad money supply, with additional stimulative effects.

Quantitative easing is appropriate currently because interest rates are already exceptionally low and cuts may fail to stimulate borrowing and spending because individuals and firms wish to reduce their debt. A clear sign that interest rates are providing insufficient stimulus is the low rate of growth of the broad money supply.

Quantitative easing is capable of directly boosting money supply growth to the level required to generate an economic recovery. To ensure the necessary impact, however, it is important that the central bank purchases securities from companies and families rather than banks. Buying from banks boosts the broad money supply only if the higher level of reserves causes them to expand their lending. In current circumstances, with banks constrained by lack of capital and potential borrowers reluctant to increase their debt, any such effect might be small.

The annual growth rate of the broad money supply, M4, adjusted for distortions caused by the financial crisis, is currently about 4%. A rise towards 10% is probably necessary to generate an economic recovery. To achieve a boost on this scale, the Bank of England may need to buy £125 billion or more of securities. In order to implement the scheme quickly while minimising distortions to market prices, the Bank should concentrate purchases in gilts rather than corporate bonds or other private sector paper. Statistical work suggests that a programme on this scale could boost gross domestic product (GDP) by more than 1% after a year.

Could quantitative easing lead to an upsurge in inflation? Not so long as policy-makers ensure that the monetary boost is temporary. Once recovery is established, broad money supply growth will need to be reined back to about 6-7% per annum to ensure consistency with the 2% inflation target over the medium term.

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COMMENT:
AUTHOR: Andrew
EMAIL:
IP: 82.109.140.145
URL: http://www.geophysicsanonymous.net
DATE: 03/05/2009 05:26:17 PM

The way you describe it makes it sound like quantitative easing is no different to the government supporting industries directly i.e., giving a bank several billion to improve their balance sheet in the hope of them lending more. Is that really true, or what you meant?

Taking this whole idea too far:
Presumably money created now by the central bank will be withdrawn from the economy at some future date (selling the bonds?). Doesn’t that make it even more like the loan above. What is the difference here?

The key elements of the announcements today were:

1. The existing asset purchase facility of up to £50 billion has been expanded to up to £150 billion, with gilt-edged securities added to the list of eligible assets, and purchases to be financed by the creation of central bank money rather than Treasury bill issuance.

2. The MPC has initially authorised purchases of £75 billion over three months. Gilts are likely to account for the majority of this amount. Purchases will be of medium- and long-maturity conventional (i.e. not index-linked) gilts.

3. The effectiveness of the programme will be judged by its impact on the supply of money and credit but the MPC has failed to specify any quantitative targets. The relevant monetary aggregate is presumably the broad money supply, M4, but this is not confirmed.

4. The MPC cut Bank rate by a further 0.5 percentage points despite possible “counter-productive effects on the operation of some financial markets and on the lending capacity of the banking system”. This suggests a split decision. The further cut is logically inconsistent with the reduction of only 0.5 percentage points last month – the MPC agreed that additional stimulus was required but judged that cutting below 1% might have no positive impact on the economy.

The welcome aspects of the announcements are that asset purchase plans are on the right scale – £150 billion is equivalent to 7.5% of M4 – and the focus on buying medium- and long-term gilts will maximise the monetary impact. (This is because longer-term gilts are held mostly outside the banking system so purchases will boost non-bank domestic investors’ bank deposits, included in M4.)

Less impressive is the MPC’s failure to specify a target impact on M4 and lending, or to make a commitment to reining back monetary growth once economic recovery is established to ensure there are no longer-term inflationary consequences. In addition, the Bank rate cut was not necessary to implement quantitative easing and is likely to put further pressure on banks’ interest margins, with negative implications for credit supply.

Amid current deep gloom, are there any signs that global economic clouds could lift later in 2009?

The most hopeful message continues to come from monetary trends. Annual growth in G7 real narrow and broad money has been picking up since August / September last year, rising further in January – see first chart. Money growth typically leads industrial output momentum by 6-12 months, suggesting a bottom in the latter by late summer at the latest.

One reservation is that the monetary acceleration has been heavily dependent on the US, reflecting Fed asset purchases. Similar action is needed in other G7 economies, though the Bank of England should step up to the plate this week. In addition, the Fed must sustain the pace of asset purchases to prevent a relapse in money growth – buying has slowed in recent weeks.

Another glimmer of hope is that output has been falling much faster than final demand, allowing inventories to decline. While G7 industrial output plunged by an estimated 14% in the year to January, retail sales volumes were “only” 5.5% lower – second and third charts. GDP reports show significant declines in inventories in the US, France and the UK in the fourth quarter (Japan was a notable exception). This supports expectations that the stocks cycle will act to support economic activity later in 2009 – a positive impact requires only a slowdown in the pace of destocking, not an actual rise in inventories.

Shorter-term indicators remain mostly grim and labour market news should be especially awful over the next few months. Nevertheless, this week’s purchasing managers surveys at least suggest some slowdown in the pace of industrial contraction – fourth chart.